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FURTHER THINKING ABOUT VICARIOUS JURISDICTION: 
REFLECTING ON GOODYEAR  V. BROWN AND LOOKING 
AHEAD TO DAIMLER AG V. BAUMAN 
LONNY HOFFMAN* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A question that arises with surprising frequency in civil 
litigation turns out to be as important as it is poorly understood: 
should a defendant ever be subject to jurisdiction based on what 
someone else did?  International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the case that 
brought federal jurisdictional law into the modern era, recognized 
the necessity of attributing contacts to any non-natural legal entity, 
such as a corporation, whose presence is “manifested only by 
activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act 
for it.”1  Almost three quarters of a century later, the courts are 
regularly called upon to decide whether it is permissible to exercise 
jurisdiction vicariously, a term I have used previously to describe 
any attempt that is made to impute the contacts of one person or 
entity to another. 2   The issue arises most often with related 
corporate entities.  One common fact pattern is when the plaintiff 
tries to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate parent 
by looking to the forum activities of its subsidiaries.3  Many other 
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1 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
2 Lonny Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1023 (2004) (analyzing jurisdiction by attribution arguments and calling for a shift 
away from the use of many substantive legal theories for jurisdictional purposes). 
3 See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(“Generally, a foreign parent corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of a 
forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing business there; the 
mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant the 
assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign parent.  It has long been recognized, 
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variations also appear in the cases.  Indeed, as I am making final 
edits to this paper, the Supreme Court just granted certiorari in 
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, et al. (cert grant, Apr. 22, 2013; 
Docket No. 11-965), a case in which the argument for jurisdiction 
turns on the activities of two corporate subsidiaries.  I discuss the 
Bauman case below.   
Despite the frequency with which courts must deal with these 
jurisdictional arguments, the lower court case law is a mess. 
Significant uncertainty looms over when, and under what 
circumstances, the contacts of another person or entity can be 
substituted for those of the defendant for jurisdictional purposes. 
The worst problems arise when courts justify the attribution of 
contacts by borrowing from substantive corporate law doctrines, 
particularly veil piercing, alter ego, and single business enterprise 
theory.  Especially problematic are the cases that look to the 
substantive law to establish general jurisdiction, one of the two 
major forms of adjudicatory authority that state and federal courts 
in the United States invoke.  With general jurisdiction, state power 
depends solely on the defendant’s relationship to the forum 
because the plaintiff’s claim is unrelated to any of its activities 
there.4  Unlike specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction is exercised 
more expansively in the United States than in most other countries; 
as a result, it has been a source of international controversy.5 
That may change after the Supreme Court’s most recent 
jurisdictional decision, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
                                                                                                                        
however, that in some circumstances a close relationship between a parent and its 
subsidiary may justify a finding that the parent ‘does business’ in a jurisdiction 
through the local activities of its subsidiaries.”) (citations omitted).  See also 
Hoffman, supra note 2, at 1029—31 (and authorities cited therein).  For a thorough 
collection of the cases see PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: 
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1983 
& Supp. 2002). 
4 See generally Hoffman, supra note 2; Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, 
Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies and 
Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1986) (positing “three methods by which substantive 
legal relations may affect the jurisdictional balance”). 
5 Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 89, 95—96 (1999) (“The Europeans’ principal objection to U.S. 
jurisdictional law is its proclivity to base general jurisdiction on rather thin 
contacts, namely, allowing any and all causes of action to be brought on the basis 
of the defendant’s physical presence, property ownership, or doing business in 
the forum.  They do not object to specific jurisdiction . . . .”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/4
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Brown,6 though it is still too early to say.  The Court left a number 
of key questions unanswered about how its refined test for general 
jurisdiction should be applied.  Notably, the exercise of vicarious 
jurisdiction was also at issue in Goodyear.  One of the plaintiffs’ 
arguments was that, because various Goodyear corporate entities 
operated as a single enterprise, the forum contacts of their U.S.-
based parent should be imputed to its foreign subsidiaries. 7  
Although the Court found the argument had not been adequately 
preserved in the lower courts, it is helpful to think more closely 
about the Goodyear decision with reference to this vicarious 
jurisdiction argument the Court did not reach.  One benefit of 
doing so is that, in the process, we may gain a better 
understanding of the test for general jurisdiction that the Court 
incompletely set forth in Goodyear. 
Returning to the plaintiffs’ unaddressed argument in Goodyear 
also provides an opportunity to revisit the core question that lies at 
the heart of any vicarious jurisdictional problem:  when and on 
what authority is it appropriate for courts to impute contacts? 
Attribution of contacts is a necessary part of modern jurisdictional 
doctrine, but, as I have previously argued, jurisdictional analysis 
would be improved significantly if courts stopped looking to 
substantive legal theories that were not designed for setting 
constitutional limits on judicial power.8  Instead of relying on veil 
piercing, alter ego, single business enterprise, and other 
substantive law doctrines to justify the exercise of jurisdiction, 
courts should keep a more disciplined focus on the defendant’s 
own connection to the forum.  That is, rather than looking to 
whether a business is adequately capitalized, or failed to follow 
corporate formalities, or any of the many other proxies that are 
regularly borrowed from substantive law to justify the attribution 
of contacts, a more straightforward and defensible jurisdictional 
doctrine would recognize that a defendant is amenable to suit in 
the forum if it (1) purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum or (2) reasonably should 
expect that someone else would act in the forum on its behalf.  I 
                                                     
6 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
7 Id. at 2857 & n.6. 
8 See Hoffman, supra note 2 (discussing the implications of the intersection of 
the substantive law regarding veil piercing and agency theory and the law of 
judicial jurisdiction).   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
HOFFMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2013  6:33 PM 
2013] VICARIOUS JURISDICTION 768 
 
argue that this alternative approach, which is amply supported by 
the Court’s prior decisions, 9  now gains added purchase with 
Goodyear’s articulation of its refined, narrower test for exercising 
general jurisdiction.  Bauman presents the Court with the next 
opportunity to address arguments for the exercise of vicarious 
jurisdiction, and lessen some existing doctrinal uncertainties in 
how judicial power is measured.   
2. DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM 
The basic impulse driving courts to attribute contacts from one 
person or entity to another is understandable.  Not only is it 
sometimes necessary to impute contacts because entities and 
individuals do not always act on their own;10 attribution of contacts 
is also driven by equitable considerations.  It would be terribly 
unjust if a defendant could avoid having to answer for his 
wrongdoing simply because he got someone else to do his 
misdeeds for him. 
But if it makes sense that we must on occasion look beyond a 
defendant’s own direct contact with the forum, courts have 
struggled to justify when it is appropriate to impute another’s 
contacts to the named wrongdoer.  To justify these jurisdictional 
leaps, courts look for a valid basis for treating another person’s or 
entity’s jurisdictionally sufficient contacts as though they were the 
                                                     
9 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984) 
(“[J]urisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction 
over the corporation which employs him; nor does jurisdiction over a parent 
corporation automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary.  
Each defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.”) 
(citations omitted); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“Petitioners are 
correct that their contacts with California are not to be judged according to their 
employer’s activities there.  On the other hand, their status as employees does not 
somehow insulate them for jurisdiction.  Each defendant’s contacts with the 
forum State must be assessed individually.”); see also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 
320, 332 (1980) (“Naturally, the parties’ relationships with each other may be 
significant in evaluating their ties to the forum.  The requirements of International 
Shoe, however, must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court 
exercises jurisdiction.”). 
10 United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 819 
(Frankfurther, J., concurring) (upholding service of process and the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporate parent based on in-state service of its 
domestic affiliate and noting that “[w]hat was done in the Southern District of 
New York on behalf of [the parent] . . . establishes that the corporation was there 
transacting business and was found there in the only sense in which a corporation 
ever ‘transacts business’ or is ‘found’”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/4
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defendant’s. The conventional practice has been to do so by 
importing substantive law into jurisdictional doctrine. 
Invoking substantive law for jurisdictional purposes is not 
always problematic.  Consider agency law.  When someone 
instructs another to act on his behalf, the obliging party acts as the 
agent of the principal and her actions bind the principal for any 
injuries that the agent causes.11  If the principal would be liable for 
its agent’s actions, then it seems reasonable to say, a priori, that the 
principal is subject to jurisdiction in the forum where its agent 
acted.  That is, the same legal foundation on which liability may 
ultimately be imposed on the principal for the agent’s actions will 
often also serve to justify requiring the principal to answer, under 
penalty of default if it does not, in the place that its agent 
committed the alleged wrongdoing on its behalf. 
While agency law is often imported without difficulty into the 
jurisdictional analysis, courts have occasionally struggled with 
figuring out whether one acted pursuant to another’s assent and 
subject to his control, as agency law typically requires. 12  
Answering these questions can mean having to wade deeply into 
the often-murky facts of the case to make what is supposed to be 
an early determination that jurisdiction exists.13  Partly to avoid 
getting too far into the merits, some courts create a new version of 
the substantive law for jurisdictional purposes so that a different 
(usually less demanding) test is used to establish jurisdictional 
amenability than to establish liability.14  This, in turn, can raise 
                                                     
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006) (“An agent acts with actual 
authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the 
principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s 
manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”). 
12 Id. § 1.01 (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one 
person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent 
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the 
agent manifests assent or otherwise consents to so act.”). 
13 Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 981 (2006) 
(describing a case in which “a preliminary hearing on jurisdiction would entail a 
full-dress trial on the merits as to all issues of liability”). 
14 See, e.g., Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., 2010 WL 1531489, at 
*12 (S.D. Fla., Apr. 16, 2010) (“Although the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff 
must satisfy a heavy burden to successfully pierce the corporate veil, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff’s allegations of alter ego are sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss.  At the motion to dismiss stage, courts are reluctant to determine the fact 
intensive question of whether a corporate entity is merely an alter ego to protect 
an individual defendant from liability.”) (citation omitted). 
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difficulties, especially in diversity cases, as federal courts fashion a 
federal common law standard of agency for jurisdictional purposes 
that varies from the substantive law they are obliged to apply as to 
liability.15  Some of the decisions that apply a reformulated agency-
for-jurisdiction test end up reaching results that are very hard to 
defend.  Indeed, the Bauman case for which the Court has recently 
granted certiorari is the most recent, significant example.16 
Whatever the difficulties have been in looking to agency law 
for deciding jurisdiction, far greater problems arise when courts 
turn to other substantive law doctrines.  The worst abuses occur 
when corporate law doctrines, such as alter ego, veil piercing 
doctrine, and single business enterprise theory are imported into 
the jurisdictional analysis. 17   The fundamental difficulty is that 
these substantive doctrines were developed to take account of 
interests different from those relevant to measuring constitutional 
limits on judicial power.18  A parent company’s failure to follow 
                                                     
15 Moreover, when we move beyond corporations to other non-natural 
entities, still other difficulties arise with the application of agency law to decide 
jurisdictional amenability.  For instance, most courts insist that jurisdiction over a 
partner or member confers jurisdiction over the partnership because the partner is 
the agent of the partnership.  See, e.g., Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 
459, 466 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The general rule is that jurisdiction over a partner confers 
jurisdiction over the partnership.”).  Not all agree, however.  And when it comes 
to other non-natural entities, like unincorporated associations, the doctrine 
becomes even more muddled, even within circuits.  Thus, after recognizing the 
general rule of attribution as to partnerships, the First Circuit refused to impute 
the contacts of one member to an unincorporated association.  Id. at 472 (refusing 
to exercise general jurisdiction over an unincorporated association that “does not 
itself conduct significant activities in, or enjoy affiliating circumstances with, a 
state . . . on the basis of a member’s contacts within the state unless the member 
carries on the in-forum activities under the association’s substantial influence”). 
But see Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 
54 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that “Donatelli’s substantial influence test does not 
control the entire universe of cases in which one party’s contacts might be 
attributed to another;” suggesting, but not deciding, that Donatelli’s attribution 
analysis was limited to general jurisdiction cases; and ultimately upholding the 
attribution of contacts from one joint venture to another to support the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction).   
16  See infra text accompanying note 32 (discussing Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
17 See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 1065–66, 1075–76 (discussing the dangers of 
incorporating substantive corporate law doctrines into the jurisdictional analysis). 
18 Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995) 
(“Conspiracy as an independent basis for jurisdiction has been criticized as 
distracting from the ultimate due process inquiry: whether the out-of-state 
defendant’s contact with the forum was such that it should reasonably anticipate 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/4
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corporate formalities, hold regular shareholder meetings, or 
adequately capitalize its subsidiary often has little to do with the 
underlying reasons why a court should be able to compel a 
defendant to defend against civil liability in the forum, under 
penalty of default if he does not.19  Indeed, these corporate law 
doctrines—especially veil piercing law—long have been derided 
for being applied in a manner difficult to defend even as to 
substantive liability.20 
The intuition behind vicariously imputing to the parent the 
contacts of its subsidiary is sound: if different components of a 
business enterprise are essentially all acting as one, it sounds 
reasonable to not permit the wrongdoer to avoid accountability by 
letting it hide behind a legal fiction.  In practice, courts often get 
badly confused as they wrestle with vicarious jurisdiction 
arguments and end up reaching decisions that are neither 
necessary nor defensible. 
3. ATTRIBUTION OF CONTACTS TO ESTABLISH GENERAL 
JURISDICTION 
Vicarious jurisdiction arguments are made to establish both 
specific and general jurisdiction, the two broad categories used to 
describe the exercise of judicial jurisdiction.  In contrast to general 
jurisdiction, the state’s regulatory interest is easier to recognize 
when the claim arises out of the defendant’s contact with the 
forum. 21   As a result, vicarious jurisdiction arguments for the 
                                                                                                                        
being haled into a court in the forum state.  To comport with due process, the 
exercise of long arm jurisdiction over a defendant must rest not on a conceptual 
device but on a finding that the nonresident . . . has purposefully availed himself 
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
19 Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 721 n.5 (Tex. 
App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002) 
(“Although many of the factors relevant to [determining whether subsidiaries’ 
contacts should be imputed to parent] may also be relevant in determining 
whether a parent corporation should be liable for the actions of its subsidiary, the 
determination whether two corporate entities are one and the same for 
jurisdictional purposes is distinct.”). 
20 See Hoffman, supra note 2 at 1075–82 and authorities cited therein 
(summarizing critiques of veil piercing law). 
21 See Allan Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 
63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 537 (2012) (“[B]ased on a state’s regulatory interest in the 
underlying controversy[,] . . . [s]tates normally have authority over absent 
defendants to redress harm caused by the defendant’s activity within or outside of 
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exercise of specific jurisdiction often are more defensible because 
the rationale for imputing contacts more closely tracks the state’s 
interest in exercising jurisdiction.  Though this finding is not to say 
that the specific jurisdiction cases always make sense, the most 
problematic jurisdictional problems tend to arise when the 
plaintiff’s claims are entirely unrelated to the defendant’s forum 
activities. 
3.1.  General Jurisdiction Doctrine 
Before International Shoe, the only recognized grounds for 
establishing jurisdiction over a defendant were physical presence 
in the forum or consent.  Under the theory of territorial jurisdiction 
first set out in Pennoyer v. Neff, it made no difference whether the 
plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant had any connection 
to the state. 22   All that mattered was the defendant’s physical 
presence in the forum.  After International Shoe announced a more 
flexible contacts-based fairness test (at least for all cases not 
involving physical forum presence), the relatedness of the 
plaintiff’s claim to the defendant’s forum contacts suddenly 
mattered.  A single contact is now sufficient under the International 
Shoe test to satisfy due process when the claim arises out of that 
contact with the forum.23 
                                                                                                                        
the forum. . . . In the case of general jurisdiction, that regulatory justification is, by 
definition, off the table.”); but see also Stephen B. Burbank, All the World His Stage, 
52 AM. J. COMP. L. 741, 751-52 (2003) (reviewing ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DOCTRINES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF 
COMMON- AND CIVIL-LAW SYSTEMS (2003)) (recognizing that, in most general 
jurisdiction cases, the forum state’s regulatory interest is slight, but favoring an 
approach that would require the exercise of general jurisdiction to satisfy the 
second-stage ‘reasonableness’ prong of the Shoe test—a prong that is now 
regularly applied to specific jurisdiction exercises—and noting that this approach 
would allow proper consideration of all relevant factors, including: a plaintiff’s 
forum domicile and the state’s regulatory interest).  Whether Professor Burbank’s 
favored approach remains viable after Goodyear is uncertain.  See Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 n.5 (2011); Stephen 
B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper Tiger?, 33 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 663, 671 (2012) (discussing Goodyear and noting that “the Court’s 
footnote [5] seems to foreclose such reasoning altogether”).     
22 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
23 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (noting that some 
single acts, “because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their 
commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit”); 
see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that a 
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International Shoe also recognized that some courts previously 
had upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants with a 
great many forum contacts, even when those contacts were 
unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action against him.24  Today, we 
refer to this basis as the exercise of general jurisdiction or “all-
purpose jurisdiction,” as Justice Ginsburg recently called it.25 
The question in Goodyear was whether three foreign 
subsidiaries of Goodyear had sufficient contacts to subject them to 
jurisdiction in North Carolina, home of the plaintiffs’ decedents, 
for claims arising from a bus accident in Europe.  The foreign 
subsidiaries owned no manufacturing facilities in North Carolina 
and operated no businesses in the state themselves.  Their only 
connection to North Carolina was that some of the tires they made 
in their overseas facilities—not the tires involved in the crash—
ended up there, distributed through Goodyear’s conglomerate 
network of which they were a part. 
Because the claim asserted against them had nothing to do with 
North Carolina, they were amenable to suit in the state, if at all, 
only on the basis of general jurisdiction.  Unanimously, however, 
the Court concluded that these modest contacts (only “a small 
percentage” of their tires ended up in North Carolina26) were not 
nearly enough to establish general jurisdiction.  Here’s the payoff 
quote:  
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-
state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all 
claims against them when their affiliations with the State 
are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them 
essentially at home in the forum State.27 
                                                                                                                        
California court could properly exercise jurisdiction over an Arizona corporation 
because “the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with 
[California]”). 
24 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the 
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of 
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.”). 
25 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (2011). 
26 Id. at 2852 (“[A] small percentage of petitioners’ tires (tens of thousands out 
of tens of millions manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed within 
North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates.”). 
27 Id. at 2851 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317). 
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A succinct, but not self-explanatory formulation, the 
“essentially at home” standard did not have to be more fully 
fleshed out because, on the facts of this particular case, it was 
readily apparent that the foreign subsidiaries were far from home 
in North Carolina.  But what about closer cases?  Is a corporation 
essentially at home in a state in which it does substantial business 
and employs hundreds of employees, even if it is incorporated and 
has its principal place of business elsewhere?28  And what about 
foreign companies?  Do we treat them differently than domestic 
entities which, by definition, can always safely be sued if the 
plaintiff is willing to travel to the state in which the company is 
incorporated?  Courts and commentators have been wrestling with 
these, and other, questions since the decision came down.29 
3.2.  Vicarious Jurisdiction for General Jurisdiction Purposes 
Lacking certainty about the rationales underpinning and full 
scope of general jurisdiction, lower courts have struggled in 
dealing with vicarious jurisdiction arguments when they are made 
to try to exercise this form of jurisdiction.  Especially problematic 
have been cases in which courts blindly apply substantive law 
doctrines like veil piercing, alter ego, and business enterprise 
theory for jurisdictional purposes in contexts for which these 
substantive law doctrines were never intended. 
Perhaps the most egregious recent example is the case on 
which the Court has just granted review, DaimlerChrysler AG v. 
                                                     
28 Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction 
Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 426 (2012) (noting 
that “[m]inimal guidance, though, was provided on when a corporation can be 
regarded to be essentially or in a sense ‘at home’ in a state” and that, beyond place 
of incorporation and principal place of business, “the Court did not indicate what 
else may satisfy the standard”); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the 
Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 321–22 (2012) (“But the Court never 
indicated whether home could go beyond those places.  Even if doing substantial 
‘continuous and systematic’ business in a state—operating stores, maintaining 
offices, and making sales—can create general jurisdiction, the Court left 
unexplained how much business is sufficient to render a defendant essentially at 
home in a state.”); Collyn Peddie, Mi Casa Es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General 
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations after Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 
v. Brown, 63 S.C. L. REV. 697, 698 (2012) (noting that the Court “failed to define, 
for future cases, what it meant by ‘essentially at home,’ a phrase it has used in no 
other context”). 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 36–38. 
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Bauman, et al.30  In Bauman, Argentine citizens brought suit against 
Daimler AG.  Plaintiffs alleged that a subsidiary of Daimler AG’s 
predecessor-in-interest conspired with the government in 
Argentina to torture and kill relatives of the plaintiffs back in the 
1970s.  Although the facts of the case had no connection 
whatsoever to California, the Ninth Circuit upheld the exercise of 
jurisdiction over Daimler AG in the state.  Looking to California’s 
substantive law of agency, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
California subsidiary was the parent’s agent in the state for 
jurisdictional purposes.  Because the California subsidiary was 
subject to general jurisdiction, so too was its parent company.31 
The scope of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is breathtaking.  
Layering a jurisdiction-by-attribution argument on top of a 
substantive liability-by-attribution theory, the decision permits the 
exercise of jurisdiction in California over a foreign parent 
company, even though the alleged wrongdoing was not committed 
in California and the alleged wrongdoer was not the foreign 
parent.  The injured plaintiffs allege they suffered at the hands of 
Daimler AG’s South American subsidiary and their theory of 
liability—yet untested—is that the corporate parent bears 
responsibility for its subsidiary’s actions.  Neither the plaintiffs, 
who are Argentine, nor their claims, have anything to do with 
California.  Their sole justification for suing the foreign parent in 
California is that the extensive contacts of one of its other 
subsidiaries, which is not alleged to have had anything to do with 
the wrongdoing in Argentina, should be attributable to the parent, 
thereby rendering the parent subject to jurisdiction in California 
for any claim whatsoever.32 
The Goodyear case itself is another example of how substantive 
law is often badly misapplied in making a vicarious jurisdiction 
argument.  Before the trial and appellate court, plaintiffs argued 
                                                     
30 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g and 
reh’g en banc denied, 676 F.3d 774, petition for cert. filed, Feb. 6, 2012. 
31 Id. 
32 Daimler’s request for en banc review was denied, but it yielded a vigorous 
dissent by Judge O’Scannlain that eight other judges joined.  Bauman, 676 F.3d 
(O’Scannlain, dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing and petition for 
rehearing en banc).  Daimler subsequently filed a petition for certiorari which was 
to be considered by the Supreme Court at its September 2012 conference.  The 
Court announced no disposition of the petition, however, and as of this writing it 
remains pending. 
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that the Goodyear foreign defendants had continuous and 
systematic contacts in North Carolina to justify the exercise of 
general jurisdiction over it.  Their argument was not well 
developed, however.  Plaintiffs emphasized the thousands of tires 
sold in the state that were manufactured by these foreign 
defendants.  Even if these sales would have been considered 
extensive enough to constitute “continuous and systematic” 
contacts, plaintiffs faced the added obstacle that the tires were 
actually sold in North Carolina not by the foreign subsidiaries but 
by their U.S.-based parent company.  Perhaps to overcome this 
barrier, plaintiffs emphasized that the foreign subsidiaries were 
part of a “highly integrated structure” with their U.S. parent.33  For 
instance, in their state appellate brief, plaintiffs argued: 
The manufacturer of the tire, Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.S., is 
a wholly owned subsidiary and the other defendants are 
operating subsidiaries of a multi-national, multi-billion 
dollar Goodyear corporation that is based in the United 
States and directed by a board of directors located in the 
United States.  They necessarily have ongoing and repeated 
contacts with the U.S., which directs the companies on a 
world-wide basis.  For example, their 30(b)(6) witness 
testified that the U.S. directs the Turkish manufacturing 
company as to how many of each tire to make so it can best 
meet the market for tires around the world.34 
This potion of their brief is the closest plaintiffs came to 
arguing that the substantive law justified imputing to the foreign 
subsidiaries the contacts of their U.S.-based parent company, 
which conceded it was subject to general jurisdiction in North 
Carolina.  Before the North Carolina courts, the plaintiffs never 
referenced single business enterprise doctrine specifically (or any 
other corporate law doctrine) and they never even expressly asked 
the lower courts to attribute the parent’s contacts to the foreign 
defendants.  Nevertheless, the ultimate, if not well articulated 
point the plaintiffs were trying to make in their briefing was that 
these companies were all operating as a unitary business 
                                                     
33 Peddie, supra note 28 (discussing the Courts treatment of the Goodyear 
respondents’ “primary argument”). 
34 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 23, Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2000) (No. COA08-994), 2008 WL 5026893. 
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enterprise; consequently, if Goodyear had continuous and 
systematic contacts with North Carolina, then so too must its 
foreign subsidiaries, whose tires are sold by Goodyear in the state. 
Despite the plaintiffs’ poor effort to defend the exercise of 
general jurisdiction, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss, finding that defendants had “continuous and 
systematic” contacts in the state.  The North Carolina Court of 
Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision, but in the process further 
complicated the record.  While affirming the trial court’s 
determination that the defendants’ contacts were “continuous and 
systematic,” the appellate court made the separate error of 
conflating general jurisdiction with “stream of commerce” theory, 
a concept that applies only when specific jurisdiction is sought 
over a distant manufacturer whose products have caused injury in 
the forum.35  After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, plaintiffs’ 
new counsel before the U.S. Supreme Court valiantly tried to avoid 
the convoluted reasoning of the appellate court by trying to 
expand on the plaintiffs’ earlier attempt to invoke single business 
enterprise theory to justify the attribution of contacts.  She did not 
succeed, however, as the Court declined to reach the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ now more fully fleshed out vicarious jurisdiction 
argument, finding that the argument had not been preserved 
below.36 
3.3.   Insights Into Goodyear’s “Essentially At Home” Standard 
Before considering whether Goodyear offers any lessons about 
how to think about vicarious jurisdiction, we must first consider a 
more fundamental uncertainty about the decision.  Elegant and 
succinct, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opinion leaves unanswered 
how the “essentially at home” standard is to be applied as to 
corporate defendants.  One of the key questions the decision raises 
                                                     
35 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 
(2011) (noting that the state appellate court “[c]onfus[ed] or blend[ed] general and 
specific jurisdictional inquiries”); Stein, supra note 21, at 530 (discussing the lower 
court decision in Goodyear and observing that “[i]f a first-year law student had 
written that answer on my Civil Procedure final exam, I would have had a hard 
time giving it a passing grade”). 
36 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 130 S.Ct. 
2847, 2861 (2010)). 
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is whether a company can ever be said to be “essentially at home” 
outside its state of incorporation or principal place of business. 
Certainly, there is an argument to be made that Goodyear limits 
general jurisdiction over corporations to no more than these two 
places.  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court emphasizes that 
general jurisdiction will lie not simply because a company has 
“continuous and systematic” contacts with a forum but only when 
those contacts are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render 
them essentially at home in the forum State.” 37   This framing 
suggests that substantial presence in a state—what previously was 
often referred to as “doing business” jurisdiction—is not enough 
when the company’s principal place of business is elsewhere.  
Additionally, the Court’s description of its earlier decision in 
Perkins also seems to suggest that only a corporate presence 
equivalent to an individual’s domicile, which has long been 
understood in singular terms, will justify general jurisdiction and 
that this corporate domicile is to be found only in the state in 
which the company’s business predominates.  “Ohio was the 
corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business,” the Court 
says of the facts in Perkins and the place in which the company’s 
“sole wartime business activity was conducted.”38 
Recognizing that some read Goodyear this restrictively,39  the 
better view is that while the corporate home usually will be its 
state of incorporation and, if different, also its principal place of 
business, the “essentially at home” standard is capacious enough 
to also permit general jurisdiction to be exercised, in certain rare 
instances, when a company engages in some (admittedly still 
undefined degree of) “continuous and systematic” business in a 
state, even if does even more business elsewhere.40  The decision 
                                                     
37 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 317 (1945)). 
38 Id. at 2857. 
39 See, e.g., Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing 
Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012) (discussing the ramifications of 
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846). 
40 See Rhodes, supra note 28, at 428-29 (explaining that “[i]f a corporation is 
conducting core executive and administrative functions within a state, such as 
controlling its operations, billing its customers, accounting for its financial status, 
managing its employees, and establishing its pricing structure, it is acting in a 
similar manner to a local business in the state,” and thus “it might be ‘fairly 
regarded as at home’ there, even if it conducts more of such command and 
coordinating functions in another state . . .”). 
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may not provide clear guidance as to how much and what kind of 
“continuous and systematic” business is sufficient, but what is 
clear is that the Court adopted an intentionally flexible standard. 
Consider the test the Court articulated and compare it to the 
obvious alternative it did not.  Had the Court wished to entirely 
exclude other bases for general jurisdiction, it could have opted for 
a straightforward rule: when the claim is unrelated to the 
defendant’s forum presence, jurisdiction is allowed only where a 
business is organized or has its primary hub.  That, of course, is 
exactly what Congress has done in 28 U.S.C. §1332(c), the statutory 
provision that defines corporate citizenship for diversity purposes 
as “every” state in which a company is incorporated and “the” 
state in which it has its principal place of business.  In Hertz v. 
Friend, the Court recognized in this statutory language the 
legislative preference for ease of judicial administration over a 
more flexible standard; under §1332(c), “principal place of 
business” is a single place.41  By contrast, the Court in Goodyear left 
the same phrase undefined for purposes of jurisdiction to 
adjudicate.  More critically, it also chose to describe the affiliation 
necessary to trigger general jurisdiction with intended wiggle-
room, even though a more precise alternative was readily 
available.42 
It is also critical to say, though, that while the decision is 
broader than it could have been, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the 
Court nevertheless makes clear that this all-purpose form of 
jurisdiction is meant to be narrower than many of the cases that 
had upheld general jurisdiction in the past.43  Before Goodyear, the 
                                                     
41 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192-93 (2010) (“We conclude that 
[1332(c)’s use of] ‘principal place of business’ is best read as referring to the place 
where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 
activities.  It is the place that Courts of Appeals have called the corporation’s 
‘nerve center.’ . . . A corporation’s ‘nerve center,’ usually its main headquarters, is 
a single place.”). 
42 But see Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent 
Supreme Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (arguing 
that Hertz’s interpretation of “principal place of business” in 1332(c) should 
govern Goodyear’s test for general jurisdiction over corporations). 
43 Rhodes, supra note 28, at 430 (“Regardless of the precise application of 
Goodyear’s ‘essentially at home’ language, the Court undoubtedly rejected the 
reasoning of many lower court decisions that doing some quantum of business 
with forum residents alone sufficed for the defendant’s amenability to any cause 
of action.  The longstanding fiction that ‘doing business’ creates corporate 
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rationale for general jurisdiction was often premised on the idea 
that a substantial enough presence overcame any concerns about 
the unfairness of subjecting a defendant to suit in forum for claims 
unrelated to its contacts there.44  That left room for concluding that 
a reasonable volume of business activity, by itself, could be 
sufficient to support general jurisdiction.  The Goodyear decision 
roundly rejects this kind of “sprawling view of general 
jurisdiction.”45  After Goodyear, it is evident that a corporation’s 
“continuous activity of some sorts within a state” may not be 
enough; certainly, the notion that a manufacturer or seller could be 
subject to general jurisdiction “on any claim for relief, wherever its 
products are distributed” was rejected.46  This constriction of prior 
conceptions of general jurisdiction surely brings the doctrine more 
into harmony with international norms, as several scholars have 
noted.47 
Still, language matters and Ginsburg’s choice of an 
intentionally indeterminate test cannot be overlooked.  This notion 
is perhaps just another way of saying that the ultimate inquiry 
Goodyear demands is worth recollecting:  to determine where the 
defendant is at home or “essentially” at home.48  Having opted for 
indeterminacy, the Court seems to have concluded that, when it 
comes to general jurisdiction, close enough sometimes counts. 
Ginsburg’s citation to and reliance on Lea Brilmayer’s earlier 
analytic work further underscores that general jurisdiction may 
sometimes include states other than a company’s state of 
                                                                                                                        
‘presence’ and supports a corporation’s amenability to general jurisdiction has 
been vanquished.”). 
44 See id.  
45 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856-7 
(2011); Blanchard, supra note 42, at 32 (“[G]one are the days when a corporation 
could be haled into court based on ‘doing-business’  factors such as the amount of 
sales, warehouses, factories, or employees it has in a given state.”). 
46  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856. 
47  Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 
63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 532 (2012) (noting that the decision is “consistent with 
international consensus,” citing inter alia Article 2 of the European Regulation on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, which authorizes 
general jurisdiction only over defendants from member states where they are 
domiciled). 
48 Id. at 533 (“What are the attributes of being ‘at home’ that justify 
jurisdiction? And what is the meaning of ‘essentially’? Presumably, that is 
something short of ‘actually’ being at home, but how short?”); Rhodes, supra note 
42, at 425. 
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incorporation or principal place of business.  The Court drew an 
analogy between an individual’s domicile and a corporation’s 
place of incorporation and principal place of business.  Following 
Brilmayer, it described these places as “paradigm” forums for 
exercising general jurisdiction: “For an individual, the paradigm 
forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s 
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which 
the corporation is fairly regarded as at home,” then cited 
Brilmayer’s identification of domicile, place of incorporation, and 
principal place of business as “paradigm” bases for exercise of 
general jurisdiction.49 
Critical to understanding this passage and the reference to 
Brilmayer’s work is to recognize that while she described these 
paradigm bases as “unique affiliations” that an individual or 
corporation has with a state, Brilmayer also recognized that courts 
properly rely on other, non-unique bases to justify the exercise of 
this kind of jurisdiction, including substantial forum activities, 
consent, and presence.  Brilmayer argued that, though less strong 
than the place in which it is incorporated or has its largest or most 
important business presence, a defendant’s substantial business 
activity in a state could nevertheless mean that its relationship with 
the forum permits courts there to exercise jurisdiction over it even 
when the claim is unrelated to the defendant’s activity there. It is 
this conception of “paradigm” forums for general jurisdiction that 
the Supreme Court adopted:  they are the strongest, but not the 
only, affiliations that can justify the exercise of this forum of all-
purpose jurisdiction.50 
The best reading, then, of Goodyear’s “essentially at home” 
standard is that a corporate defendant usually will just be 
amenable to general jurisdiction in a corporation’s two “paradigm” 
forums, its state of incorporation or principal place of business, but 
there may be occasions when other bases of jurisdiction, including 
enough “continuous and systematic” contacts, will also justify the 
exercise of general jurisdiction. 51   The ordinary presumption is 
                                                     
49 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at 
General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723 (1988)). 
50 Brilmayer, supra note 49, at 782. 
51 Cf. Stein, supra note 47, passim (arguing that to be met Goodyear’s 
“essentially at home” has to be a place [though it could be multiple places] in 
which “a defendant must perceive itself, and be perceived, as a member of the 
community” and suggesting a number of factors to consider in making this 
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certainly best applied to domestic entities because, by definition, 
there will always be at least one state in which they can be sued on 
any claim whatsoever. 
Foreign corporations are another matter, however.  As Lindsey 
Blanchard has argued, the distinction between domestic and 
foreign entities indeed may have been precisely what the Court 
had in mind when it intentionally left the door more ajar than it 
otherwise needed.52  Thus, a strong argument can be made that 
under Goodyear foreign corporate defendants may be amenable to 
general jurisdiction in the U.S. state in which they do their most 
substantial business (assuming the quantum is “so continuous and 
systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum 
State”).53 
3.4.  Lessons From Goodyear About Vicarious Jurisdiction 
The Court’s failure in Goodyear to confront the vicarious 
jurisdiction that plaintiffs made in that case means that debate will 
continue over whether a defendant, not otherwise subject to 
general jurisdiction, can nevertheless be held to be generally 
amenable to suit in the forum by attributing to it the contacts of 
someone or something else.  In particular, the key question 
remaining is whether there is anything in Goodyear’s articulation of 
the “essentially at home” standard that would preclude the kind of 
excessive vicarious jurisdiction exercises that courts frequently 
permit.  I think there is. 
Though a more determinate test for general jurisdiction would 
have made it even harder to make freewheeling vicarious 
jurisdiction arguments, given the overall narrowing effect of the 
decision, it is hard to imagine that the Court would permit the kind 
of exercises of general jurisdiction that both the Ninth Circuit’s 
pre-Goodyear opinion in Bauman and the lower courts in Goodyear 
                                                                                                                        
determination); Rhodes, supra note 47, at 426 (concluding that under Goodyear a 
corporation can be “essentially at home” in places other than where it is 
incorporated or has its principal place of business but that it must be a place, “at 
the very minimum,“ that the nonresident corporation act similarly to a local 
domiciliary by directing, controlling, and coordinating its operations on a 
continuous basis from the forum state”). 
52  Blanchard, supra note 42, at 33. 
53 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851; see also Burbank, supra note 21 at 752-53 (urging 
recognition that the scope of general jurisdiction constitutional amenability may 
vary depending on whether the corporation is domestic or foreign). 
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authorized.  As for Goodyear, even if the plaintiffs’ single business 
enterprise argument had been adequately developed before the 
lower courts, the problem with looking to that substantive law 
doctrine is that it turns the law of enterprise theory on its head.  
While there are plenty of cases that attribute contacts upstream 
from the subsidiary to the parent, scant authority exists for doing 
the reverse.  After all, the fundamental rationale that justifies 
disregarding the otherwise separate legal status of a separately 
incorporated subsidiary is that the parent is controlling it, not the 
other way around.54  When roles are reversed, however, it makes 
little sense to talk about attributing the jurisdictional amenability of 
the parent company to its foreign subsidiaries which do not control 
or direct the forum activities of the parent. 
Cases like Bauman also seem inconsistent with Goodyear’s 
narrowing of general jurisdiction.  The Court in Goodyear asked 
whether foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. parent company were 
amenable to suit in North Carolina on claims unrelated to any 
activities by the subsidiaries in the state and answered, 
unanimously and definitively, that they were not.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s layering of jurisdictional amenability on top of its 
argument for imposing substantive liability on the corporate 
parent makes the plaintiffs’ argument for jurisdiction in Goodyear 
look modest, by comparison.  Bauman stretches the reasonableness 
of exercising general jurisdiction vicariously beyond any 
constitutional limit that Justice Ginsburg’s Goodyear opinion can 
plausibly be read to recognize. 
To be sure, the Goodyear decision still leaves room for more 
traditional exercises of vicarious jurisdiction over a controlling 
corporate parent on a general jurisdiction basis.  However, 
Ginsburg’s constriction of general jurisdiction beyond how it had 
been applied in many lower courts strongly suggests that, at least 
as to a domestic company, there is never a need to permit vicarious 
attribution of contacts.  Even when the net of specific jurisdiction is 
not wide enough, the plaintiff can simply sue in the state in which 
                                                     
54 See, e.g., Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund v. Ipsen, S.A., 450 Fed. 
Appx. 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Where a parent and subsidiary observe corporate 
formalities, the plaintiff has a heavy burden to establish a degree of control 
sufficient to impute the subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts to the parent.”). 
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the domestic parent is incorporated or has its principal place of 
business.55 
The one occasion, then, when attribution of contacts may still 
be warranted is over a foreign corporation.  As noted earlier, one 
might reasonably read Goodyear as limiting general jurisdiction 
only over domestic entities to their state of incorporation or 
principal place of business, under the theory that there will always 
be at least a place that a plaintiff can sue a U.S. company without 
fear it will move for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.  By 
contrast, a foreign defendant might be found to have enough 
dealings with a U.S. forum so as to subject it to general jurisdiction 
there on the ground that it was acting as if that state were its home 
in the United States. 
Even as to foreign corporations, however, it is not necessary to 
borrow substantive law doctrines like veil piercing or business 
enterprise theory in order to justify the exercise of jurisdiction.  
Rather than looking to these substantive law doctrines, one need 
only recognize that a foreign corporate defendant may do business 
in the forum on its own or may do so through one of its 
subsidiaries (or through an entirely separate entity or person).  
Existing jurisdictional doctrine already permits courts to conclude 
that the defendant’s own actions, as well as those that it asks or 
directs others to take on its behalf, can properly be regarded as 
purposeful availment by the foreign defendant of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum.56 
                                                     
 55 Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: 
Paths to a Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 390 (2004) (“There is an argument to 
be made that, with the adoption of grounds of activity-based or specific 
jurisdiction that International Shoe invited, and given the continued acceptance of 
domicile (including state of incorporation) as a basis of general jurisdiction, ‘doing 
business’ jurisdiction should not be permitted, or should be substantially scaled 
back, in litigation involving domestic (U.S.) defendants.”). 
56  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) 
(“Hence, if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or 
Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the 
manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its 
product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those 
States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to 
its owner or to others.”); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) 
(“[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the 
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”) (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297) (alteration in original). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Revisiting the vicarious jurisdiction argument the Court left 
unaddressed in Goodyear provides an opportunity to gain insights 
into how to interpret the incompletely articulated test for general 
jurisdiction that the Court announced in Goodyear.  It also allows us 
to reconsider the core question that lies at the heart of any 
vicarious jurisdictional problem:  when and on what authority is it 
appropriate for courts to impute contacts? 
How the “essentially at home” test is applied in the future will 
shape our understanding of the reasons why general jurisdiction 
exists.  That, in turn, will bear relevance to how courts handle 
arguments to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by vicariously 
imputing contacts.  
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